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a b s t r a c t
During the last two decades, the Internet has changed people’s habits and improved their daily
life activities and services. In particular, the emergence of e-commerce provided manufac-
tures and vendors with more business opportunities. This allowed customers to beneﬁt from
a global, quicker and cheaper shopping environment. However, e-commerce is evolving from
a centralised approach, where consumers directly purchase products and services from busi-
nesses, to a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) perspective, in which customers buy and sell goods amongst
themselves. In P2P scenarios, it is crucial to protect both buyers and sellers (the peers) from
being victimised by possible fraud arising from the uncertainties, vagueness and ambiguities
that characterise the interactions amongst unknown business entities. For this reason, the
so-called reputation models are becoming a key architectural component of any e-commerce
portal. These systems are intended to evaluate the basic features of each entity (buyer, seller,
goods, etc.) involved in a given trading transaction in order to assess the trust level of the
given transaction and minimise fraud. However, in spite of their wide deployment, the rep-
utation models need to be enhanced to handle the various sources of uncertainties in order
to produce more accurate outputs which will allow to increase the trust and decrease the
fraud levels within e-commerce systems. In this paper, we present an interval type-2 fuzzy
logic based framework for reputation management in (P2P) e-commerce which is capable of
better handling the faced uncertainties. We have carried out various experiments based on
eBay®-like transaction datasets which have shown that the proposed type-2 fuzzy logic based
system can provide better performance (in terms of malicious peer detection and exchanged
message overhead) when compared to the other well-known and heavily used approaches
like the eBay® approach, EigenTrust, PeerTrust as well as the type-1 fuzzy based counterpart
approach.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction1
The Internet and theWorld Wide Web (WWW) improved the lifestyle of people from all over the World in different aspects of2
everyday life activities and services. Thanks to mobile network technologies, people can now get access from anywhere and at3
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any time to a set of increasing social and economic services enabling a smart and quick exploitation of resources and facilities.4
One of the most important and fast growing Internet based sectors is e-commerce which started around 1991 when the Internet5
was opened to commercial use. Since that date, numerous businesses were launched on websites which employed transaction6
automation to improve the eﬃciency and reliability. E-commerce is completely changing the way in which people, customers7
and/or vendors, perform their negotiations and exchange goods and services. E-commerce can be seen as deﬁning a new “econ-8
omy” by providing more business opportunities to manufactures and companies. In addition, e-commerce allows customers to9
beneﬁt from a quicker and cheaper shopping on the Internet.10
E-commerce started by following the Business to Consumer (B2C) paradigm [1] where consumers purchase products and11
services directly from businesses. This paradigm represents a sort of marketplace for the worldwide exposure of products. In this12
centralised paradigm, customers are protected from eventual frauds since the quality of the sale service depends only upon the13
reputation of the seller company that acts as an authority to mediate transaction ﬂows.14
The recent years are witnessing the evolution of a new e-commerce paradigm called Peer-to-Peer (P2P) or Consumer to Con-15
sumer (C2C) [1] in which customers buy and sell among themselves without using a centralised e-commerce authority. The16
extensive development of this new business paradigm is due to the reduction in costs. Indeed, sellers can post their goods over17
the Internet cheaply compared to the high rent space in a store and, as a consequence, they can sell with lower prices by produc-18
ing a ﬁnancial gain for buyers. However, in such a new business context, it is crucial to protect both buyers and sellers (peers)19
from being victimised by possible frauds due to the uncertainties, vagueness and ambiguities which characterise the interactions20
amongst unknown business entities. For this reason, the so-called reputation models aimed at assessing the trust levels of peers21
during trade transactions are becoming a key architectural component of any e-commerce portal.22
The main goal of reputation models is to compute and associate a reputation value to each peer by using the community-23
based opinions in order to allow buyers/sellers to undertake more reliable transactions. Three core components are used to build24
any reputation system: (1) the trust value that each peer has for another peer involved in at least one transaction with it; (2) the25
distributionmethod that propagates these values in the P2P network; (3) the reputation score that each peer aggregates from the26
trust values gathered from all the peers interacting with it [2]. The quality of a reputation-based P2P trust management system is27
depending on its capability in performing an accurate and effective identiﬁcation of malicious peers, and in eﬃciently reducing28
the bandwidth usage of the P2P network.29
Due to the importance of their role in enabling safety in P2P e-commerce paradigm, there has been a fervent development30
of such systems. In particular, after some ﬁrst attempts to model reputation concepts as crisp values, recently, the uncertain and31
imprecise nature of commercial transactions opened the way for promising applications of fuzzy logic theory to this important32
research area (see Section 2). Nevertheless, the precise identiﬁcation of malicious peers and the consequent improvement of33
safety in trade transactions is far from being completely solved.34
In this paper, we aim at bridging this gap by introducing a collection of e-commerce trustworthiness metrics starting from35
which to design an innovative reputation model and its implementation based on the type-2 fuzzy sets theory [3–5]. Different36
from conventional Mamdani or TSK type-1 fuzzy systems, type-2 fuzzy sets provide additional design degrees of freedom, which37
can achieve better performance in domains where lots of uncertainties are present [6], such as P2P e-commerce environments.38
Indeed, thanks to its capability to handle high level of uncertainty, the proposed framework is capable of performing a deep and39
precise analysis of all the different parameters involved in a given trading transaction and assessing the right reputation value40
for each peer belonging to a P2P e-commerce system.41
We have carried out various experiments based on eBay®-like transaction datasets to compare, in an empirical and statistical42
way, the proposed system with other well-known and widely used approaches, such as the eBay® paradigm (used in the most43
known e-market platform eBay®), EigenTrust and PeerTrust (which are two of the most cited reputation management systems in44
P2P environments), as well as, a type-1 fuzzy based approach. As shown by these comparisons, the proposed type-2 fuzzy logic45
based system yields better performance than state-of-the-art approaches in terms of malicious peer detection and exchanged46
message overhead.47
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reports a detailed description of the state-of-the-art about the repu-48
tation management systems; Section 3 will present the background knowledge including an overview on the reputation man-49
agement issues in P2P e-commerce systems and a brief description of type-2 FLSs; Section 4 presents the proposed interval50
type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management; Section 5 presents the experiments and results while Section 651
52
53
r54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62presents the conclusions and future work.
2. Related works
Reputation management systems play a crucial role in allowing the existence and eﬃciency of e-commerce thanks to theicapability to defend sellers and customers from on-line frauds. In literature, several paradigms have been proposed with the goal
to provide on-line community with even more eﬃcient reputation management systems. The eBay® reputation-based P2P trust
management system is the most popular trust-management system and it is a based a user feedback approach [7] that enables
eBay® users to evaluate the reputation value of their trading peers, and store these values to a centralised reputation database.
EigenTrust [8] is one of the most widely accepted paradigms for reputation management in distributed environments. Eigen-
Trust paradigm computes the trust score by summing the satisfactions of the transaction with each peer and then normalises it
over all its peers [8]. Then, it calculates the reputation value of a peer by aggregating the trust values assigned to it by other peers,
weighted by the reputations of the assigning peers. The trust scores are distributed in the P2P network by using a Distributed
Please cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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PFig. 1. An interval type-2 fuzzy set.
ash Table (DHT)-overlay network [9]. In [10], the PeerTrust paradigmwas presented to overcome the drawbacks of EigenTrust in
ntrolling the man-in-the-middle attack [11] as it uses overlay for trust propagation and public-key infrastructure for securing
mote scores. In addition, the PeerTrust was the ﬁrst to introduce the concept of feedback creditability to aggregate the global
putation.
The above mentioned paradigms have mainly employed crisp logic which cannot easily handle the different uncertainties,
agueness and ambiguities that characterise the interactions occurring amongst unknown business entities in P2P systems
or more details see Section 3.2). Type-1 fuzzy logic was employed to develop a ﬁrst fuzzy based reputation system, namely
uzzyTrust [12]. FuzzyTrust works by performing two inference steps: (1) trust score calculation where each peer performs a
zzy inference on local parameters to generate trust scores towards the other peers and (2) reputation aggregation where each
eer performs a weighted aggregation of the trust scores received from all peers to produce a reputation value. The propaga-
on of trust scores is executed by using a Distributed Hash Table (DHT)-overlay network with an architecture similar to that of
hord [13]. As shown by a comparison in terms of malicious peer detection, FuzzyTrust outperforms EigenTrust in malicious peer
entiﬁcation, albeit slightly. In spite of good results provided by FuzzyTrust, it cannot easily handle and model the uncertain-
es present in P2P e-commerce as they employ crisp and precise type-1 fuzzy sets [14] (i.e. their Membership Functions (MFs)
re supposedly known perfectly) which does not allow for any uncertainties about membership values. As better described in
e next section, interval type-2 fuzzy sets [15,16] are characterised by fuzzy membership functions which provide additional
egrees of freedom that make it possible to directly model and handle the strong uncertainties present in P2P e-commerce.
Starting from this consideration, our proposal is aimed at improving the performance of the state-of-the-art reputation sys-
ms in e-commerce context, by exploiting the recognised superiority of type-2 FS in modelling knowledge and processing
ncertain information. In the next section, we provide more details about type-2 fuzzy logic and reputation management issues
order to show how the type-2 fuzzy logic can better face reputation management issues with respect to the state-of-the-art
pproaches.
. Background knowledge
This section is devoted to provide a background knowledge of the concepts related to interval type-2 fuzzy logic systems,
putation management in P2P e-commerce and how type-2 fuzzy logic can face reputation management issues.
.1. Brief overview of the interval type-2 fuzzy logic systems
Fuzzy set theory was ﬁrst introduced by Zadeh [17] and has been accepted over years as a methodology for building sys-
ms that can deliver satisfactory performance in the face of uncertainty and imprecision [18,19]. However, the same Zadeh [15],
cognised that Type-1 Fuzzy Sets (T1 FSs) are able to partially handle the concept of uncertainty, whereas real-world applica-
ons are often characterised by multiple sources of strong uncertainty, ambiguity and vagueness [14]. As a consequence, recent
ears have shown a signiﬁcant attention in research toward more suitable forms of fuzzy logic [18], such as the Interval Type-2
uzzy Sets (IT2 FSs) shown in Fig. 1. IT2 FSs are considered to be potentially more appropriate in modelling uncertainty, thanks
their capability of providing extra degrees of freedom [18]. This capability is due to the exploitation of a new type of fuzzy
embership function where the membership value, for each element of the universe of the discourse, is a type-1 fuzzy set and
ot a crisp value. The use of IT2 FSs to represent the inputs and/or outputs of a Fuzzy Logic System (FLS) leads to the so-called
terval Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Systems (IT2FLSs) (shown in Fig. 2).
In detail, an IT2 FLS works as follows [14,20]: the crisp inputs are ﬁrst fuzziﬁed into input type-2 fuzzy sets; singleton fuzzi-
cation is usually used in interval type-2 FLS applications due to its simplicity and suitability for embedded processors and real
me applications. The input type-2 fuzzy sets then activate the inference engine and the rule base to produce output type-2
zzy sets. The type-2 FLS rule base remains the same as for the type-1 FLS but its Membership Functions (MFs) are represented
y interval type-2 fuzzy sets instead of type-1 fuzzy sets. The inference engine combines the ﬁred rules and gives a mapping
om input type-2 fuzzy sets to output type-2 fuzzy sets. The type-2 fuzzy output sets of the inference engine are then processed
y the type-reducer which leads to type-1 fuzzy sets called the type-reduced sets. There are different types of type-reductionlease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
eer to Peer e-commerce, Information Sciences (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2015.11.015
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Fig. 2. Structure of a type-2 FLS.
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the computationally expensive centroid type-reduction and the simple height and modiﬁed height type-reductions which hav
problems when only one rule ﬁres [14,20]. After the type-reduction process, the type-reduced sets are defuzziﬁed (by taking th
average of the type-reduced set) so as to obtain crisp outputs. More information regarding the interval type-2 FLS can be found
in [14].
Due to their capability to handle with high level of uncertainty, IT2 FLSs have been successfully implemented in many rea
world applications, including intelligent control [21], time series predictions [22,23], pattern recognition [24], image processin
[25], medical diagnosis [26], collision avoidance of autonomous vehicles [27] and many others. In the next section, we show how
beneﬁts of the IT2 FLSs can be exploited to address reputation management issues in P2P e-commerce.
3.2. Reputation management issues in P2P e-commerce systems
In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems, peers are both consumers and providers of services. Given that there is no authority to dictat
the rules for peer interaction and that interactions often occur among previously unknown parties, peers might maliciousl
behave and harm others in the system [28]. Therefore, one of the fundamental challenges for the development of open and
decentralised P2P systems, is the ability to manage risks that may arise when interacting and collaborating with previousl
unknown and potentially malicious peers. This challenge, is even more felt in P2P e-commerce systems, where the interaction
between unknown parties involves business interests, and, as a consequence of a malicious behaviour, there may be an economi
loss or even a fraud. As an example, a malicious buyer may not provide a payment for a received good, whereas, a malicious selle
may not send goods which has been paid for.
As proved in [29–31], in P2P systems, peers with the capability of reasoning about trust can potentially mitigate the risk
caused by malicious behaviours. Hence, the so-called trust management systems play a crucial role in enabling trading with
untrustworthy peers in e-commerce scenarios [32]. The conventional trust management systems [33] are based on access contro
credentials, i.e., they foresee that peers use credential veriﬁcation to enable access control to restricted services. Our research
work focuses on reputation-based trust management systems where service requesters select the relative providers based on
their reputation values. This choice is due to the wide applicability of the reputation-based trust management systems to P2
environment where the credential based conventional methods cannot be used because of their dependence to a centralised
credential authority [34]. In literature, various deﬁnitions have been given for the related but distinct concepts of reputation and
trust. One deﬁnition of “trust” was cited in [35], where it is considered as “a subjective expectation a partner has about anothe
future behaviour based on the history of their encounters”. This deﬁnition treats the trust as a subjective property computed based
on the two partners involved in a dyadic encounter. In e-commerce, the partners are peers and an encounter is a trade transaction
between them. As for the reputation concept, we consider the deﬁnition given by the Concise Oxford English Dictionary [36]
which agrees with the social network researcher’s point of view [37], which states: “the reputation is what is generally said o
believed about a person’s or thing’s character or standing”. Therefore, in our context, the reputation is the collected and processed
information about one former peer’s behaviour, as experienced by all the other ones within the system. Starting from these trus
and reputation deﬁnitions, it is easy to note that the main tasks of a reputation-based trust management system for a P2P e
commerce environment are enabling peers to rate each other with a trust value, after the completion of a trade transaction and
to aggregate these values for a given partner to derive its relative global reputation score. In this scenario, where a peer gives an
opinion towards the other ones, another important concept emerges called credibility which can be deﬁned as “the expectatio
that a rating peer has the capability and the willingness to provide a correct opinion towards the other ones” [38].
As a result of this discussion, P2P systems for e-commerce need to deal with high levels of uncertainties, vagueness and
ambiguities which include:
• absence of an authority to dictate the rules for peer interaction and to avoid peers maliciously behave and harm others in
the system;
• trading transactions occur among unknown parties potentially acting in a malicious way;
• use of the reputation value as a credibility score (examples of reputation systems which follow this strategy are EigenTrus
[8] and FuzzyTrust [12]). This strategy is not suﬃciently accurate, since some peers could behave well sending high qualitPlease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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goods (in the case they are sellers) or quick payment (in the case they are buyers) and at the same time, provide inaccurate151
or false opinions;152
• supply of good trading services by a peer for a while in order to build a good reputation. Then, suddenly, the peer starts153
cheating buyers or sellers by exploiting that reputation.154
Due to lots of uncertainties above mentioned, type-2 fuzzy logic results to be the most suitable methodology to eﬃciently155
deal with trust, reputation and credibility concepts. For this reason, we propose a new reputation management system based on156
IT2 FLSs. Indeed, as described above, IT2 FSs provide additional degrees of freedom which can handle the high level of uncer-157
tainties present in P2P e-commerce environments and provide a more suitable representation of peers’ dynamic characteristics.158
As shown in the experiment section, the exploitation of IT2 FLSs to face reputation management system issues will result in159
better performance (in terms of malicious peer detection and exchanged message overhead) when compared to the fuzzy and160
non fuzzy counterparts. Before giving all details about experiments, in the next section, the proposed system is presented in all161
its components.162
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P. The proposed type-2 fuzzy logic based reputation management framework for P2P e-commerce
This section introduces a type-2 fuzzy logic based reputation management framework which uses a new reputation model
eﬁning a set of formal metrics for evaluating the concepts of reputation, trust and credibility in uncertain environments. The
amework is arranged in a hierarchical structure of IT2 FLSs. All membership functions and rules of the designed IT2 FLSs are
ased on subjective opinions from different reputation experts who casted their personal beliefs about trustworthiness in e-
mmerce. This design strategy is particularly suitable in P2P e-commerce environments where the methods for learning fuzzy
embership functions and rules (e.g. genetic algorithms, particle swarm optimisation and so on) are hard to be applied due to
e challenge in assembling the training data sets. Precisely, the strong dynamic features characterising P2P e-commerce such
s (1) the dynamic behaviour of peers in performing trading transactions, and (2) the fast changes occurring in a P2P network in
rms of the number of the peers and relationships among them, make it hard to identify a training dataset which is suﬃciently
formative and not tied to particular and limited situations. As a consequence, the exploitation of these misleading datasets
uld lead the conventional learning methods to produce unrealistic rules which violate the e-commerce rules. As an example,
utomatic learning approaches based on static datasets might not be able to identify evolving malicious peer behaviours such
s the oscillatory behaviours consisting in building a good reputation by making a series of transactions involving cheap goods
nd trying to make a proﬁt through expensive fraudulent transactions. Our framework bridges this gap by introducing a new
putation model taking into account temporal information and its evaluation by means of a type-2 architecture.
Hereafter, ﬁrstly, we present the new model deﬁning a set of formal metrics for evaluating the concepts of reputation, trust
nd credibility in uncertain environments and, then, we describe the architecture of the proposed type-2 fuzzy logic based
putation management system and all its components.
.1. New model for reputation management in P2P e-commerce
This section introduces an innovative model for reputation management in P2P e-commerce environments. Inspired by the
eneral P2P reputation model presented in [28] and by eBay® vision on feedback concept1, the proposed model is aimed at
roviding trust and reputation computation with a set of well-deﬁned metrics and dynamic features that will enable the next
eneration of reputation management frameworks to achieve improved performance in terms of accuracy of malicious peer
entiﬁcation. Due these innovative metrics, the proposed model provides reputation management frameworks with adequate
action functionalities to address quick changes in peers’ behaviour avoiding malicious situations where peer could provide
ood trading services for a while, building a good reputation, and then suddenly start cheating buyers or sellers by exploiting
at reputation. As a consequence, this approach will enable a more eﬃcient identiﬁcation of very sly malicious peers such as
e hypocritical and oscillatory ones (see Section 5.2).
In order to achieve these goals, the proposed model for reputation management in P2P e-commerce focuses on three main
rinciples:
. trust and reputation evolve over time being sensitive to new experiences;
. the sensitivity to new experiences should not be dependent on old ones;
. the past experiences should not be ignored.
The ﬁrst principle means that trust and reputation do not decay over time if there are no new experiences, i.e., trade transac-
ons. Hence, positive experiences may lead to an increase of trust and reputation value, while negative ones may decrease such
alues.
The sensitivity of trust and reputation values to new experiences is essential to capture the changes in peers behaviour.
deed, even if a peer has shown a trustworthy behaviour for a period of time, it should still be possible to detect and decrease its
putation if it suddenly starts exhibiting malicious behaviour [28]. In order to enforce this principle, it is necessary to provide
e independence of this sensitivity to new experiences from the old ones (second principle). In our model, this leads to consider
ree kinds of trust denoted as Transaction Trust, Historical Trust and Overall Trust (see Table 1). In order to keep the independence
1 http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/allaboutfeedback.html .lease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Deﬁnitions of different kinds of the trust.
Trust typology Deﬁnition
Transaction Trust The trust that a peer has towards another one by considering only the newest transaction that occurred between them.
Historical Trust The trust that a peer has towards another one before the last transaction between them.
Overall Trust The trust computed by a peer towards another one by considering all transactions that occurred between them.
Table 2
Metrics inﬂuencing transaction trust.
Metric Deﬁnition
Metrics used by a buyer
Goods Quality The quality assessed by the buyer about the received goods.
Delivery Time The amount of time required to receive goods.
Seller Communication Quality The quality assessed by the buyer about the seller’s readiness and availability at communicating.
Shipping Service Reliability The objective reliability provided through the shipping service used by the seller.
Metrics used by a seller
Payment Time The amount of the time required to receive buyer’s payment
Payment Method Reliability The objective reliability provided by the payment method used by the buyer.
Buyer Communication Quality The quality assessed by the seller about the buyer’s readiness and availability at communicating.
Table 3
Factors inﬂuencing the overall trust.
Metric Deﬁnition
Historical Trust Date It represents the date when the historical trust value was computed. This factor allows to discriminate between new and
old experiences and to give more relevance to the transaction trust.
Last Transaction
Amount
It represents the price of the goods involved in the last transaction between two peers. This factor supports the detection of
oscillatory behaviours (i.e. behaviours characterised by a lot of honest and cheap transactions and a few malicious and
expensive ones).
of new experiences from old ones, the proposed model computes the transaction trust by only considering metrics that do no
depend upon trading transactions occurred in the past. In particular, the used metrics are inspired from eBay® vision and differ
according to the role of peers (sellers or buyers). The complete list is reported in Table 2.
However, even if new experiences are considered more important than the old ones since they represent the current be
haviour of a peer, past experiences cannot be ignored at all (third principle). Indeed, old experiences can be used to re-establish
peer trustworthiness after recovering from an intrusion attack which affected its reputation [28]. Moreover, the consideration
of past experiences is relevant to detect possible peer oscillatory behaviours consisting in building a good reputation by makin
a series of transactions involving cheap goods and, consecutively, trying to make a proﬁt through expensive fraudulent transac
tions. Due to the relevance of past experiences, as aforementioned, the proposed model considers the so-called historical trust
In detail, the proposed model expects a peer to compute the overall trust value towards another one by aggregating historica
and transaction trusts. This aggregation takes into account the factors reported in Table 3.
Apart from discussing the trust concepts, the proposed model deﬁnes also which factors are involved in the reputation com
putation. In detail, a peer computes its own reputation by means of the aggregation of overall trusts received by other peer
involved in transactions with it. For sake of simplicity, from now on, we will denote as target peer, the one which takes care o
computing its own reputation, and as commentator peer, the one which sends its opinion (overall trust value) over a target pee
which was involved in a transaction with it2. Like for trust concept, the computation of the reputation considers the new expe
riences more important than old ones. As a consequence, overall trusts received in more recent period have more weight in th
reputation aggregation step. Moreover, since multiple interactions between peers allow a more accurate evaluation, also overal
trusts computed on a greater number of transactions have more weight in the aggregation step. Finally, in order to support th
detection of oscillatory behaviours, the reputation aggregation is inﬂuenced by average amount of goods involved in the trans
actions between the target peer and commentator ones. However, the factor which mostly affects the reputation aggregation
step is the credibility of commentator peers. By concluding, in the reputation aggregation step, each weight associated with
received overall trust is inﬂuenced by the metrics reported in Table 4.
As described in the next section, the deﬁned model for reputation management in e-commerce scenarios has been imple
mented in a reputation management system based on a type-2 fuzzy sets-based architecture. In particular, we focus on thi2 It is important to point out that such distinction is made only for the ease of exposition, since a peer may act simultaneously both as target and as
commentator.
Please cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Table 4
Factors inﬂuencing weights associated to the overall trust.Q3
Metric Deﬁnition
Credibility The willingness of the commentator peer to provide a correct opinion towards the target one.
Opinion Date The date when the commentator user computed the overall trust value for the target one.
Opinion Scope The number of transactions on which the commentator user computed the overall trust value for the target one.
Average Amount The average price of goods involved in the transactions, on which the commentator user computed the overall trust value for the target
one.
Fig. 3. The architecture of the proposed reputation management system.
emergent fuzzy theory, since type-2 fuzzy sets may succeed to model the uncertain and imprecise nature of trust and reputation230
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Pncepts by imitating human reasoning more eﬃciently than type-1 fuzzy sets.
.2. The interval type-2 fuzzy architecture for reputation management
The proposed interval type-2 fuzzy system for reputation management works by using a hierarchical and incremental ap-
roach where the values related to trust concepts, deﬁned by the aforementioned model, are computed in order to aggregate a
nal reputation value for each peer involved in trading transactions. In particular, a transaction trust value is computed after a
ading transaction is completed between two peers P1 and P2, to enable P1 to assess how good was the behaviour of P2 in that
ansaction, and vice versa. P1, then computes an overall trust, T12, to assess how good was the behaviour of P2 in all trading
ansactions made with P2. In the same way P2 computes an overall trust value, T21, to assess how good was the behaviour of
1 in past transactions made with P2. Finally, P1 sends the value T12 to P2 in order to enable P2 to aggregate this value with
ther overall trust values coming from other peers to ﬁnally compute its reputation. By the same way, P2 sends T21 to P1. In
rder to make the aggregation step more reliable, our architecture uses a novel credibility concept to assure the authenticity
f information exchanged by peers. In order to perform all the aforementioned computations, each peer is equipped with the
pe-2 fuzzy architecture shown in Fig. 3 which is composed of the following modules: Trust Computation Module, Reputation
ggregation Module, Credibility Computation Module and Trusted E-commerce Database.
The Trust Computation Subsystem is used by a peer (acting as commentator peer) to evaluate the level of trustiness over
nother one (in this case acting as target peer) with whom it has just closed a trade transaction. It is implemented through a
ierarchical Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Systems (IT2FLSs) which computes, at the low level, the transaction trust value and, at
e top level, the overall trust value over the peer with whom it has just closed the transaction.
The Reputation Aggregation Subsystem is used by a target peer to compute its own reputation (representing the ﬁnal output of
e proposed type-2 fuzzy set based reputationmanagement framework). In order to compute such value, a target peer performs
weighted aggregation of overall trust values received by peers which have been involved in at least a transaction with it. The
eights used in the computation are calculated through an IT2 FLS. Once computed a real value representing own reputation,
e target peer is classiﬁed malicious if this value is labelled with the linguistic term Low of the fuzzy variable Reputation (seeig. 5(g)).
The Credibility Computation Module is used by a target peer to update the credibility value of all its commentator peers (peers
hich have been involved in at least a transactionwith it and have sent it their overall trust values over it). This updating is always
erformed after a transaction between the target peer and any commentator peer. The credibility value for a commentator peer is
lease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Fig. 4. The hierarchical type-2 fuzzy system composing the trust computation subsystem.
based on the reputation value of the target peer just computed. In detail, the credibility value of a commentator peer is increased258
if its opinion (overall trust value) over the target peer is near to the new computed reputation for the target peer, decreased vice259
versa.260
The Trusted E-commerce Database is used to locally store a set of data necessary for the computations performed by the other261
modules. In short, these data are closed in four tables: buyer transaction table contains data related to transactions where the262
peer acts as buyer; seller transaction table contains data related to transactions where the peer acts as seller; assigned trust table263
contains data related to overall trust values computed over the other peers; received trust value contains data related to overall264
trust values received by the other peers.265
Hereafter, more details about the architecture modules and the interactions among them are given.266
4.2.1. Trust Computation Subsystem267
The Trust Computation Subsystem is used by a peer (acting as commentator peer) to evaluate the level of trustiness over268
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294another one (in this case acting as target peer) with whom it has just closed a trade transaction. Such subsystem is implemented
through a hierarchical IT2FLSs which computes the trust values according to the above mentioned e-commerce trust model. Th
hierarchical IT2FLSs is composed of two levels (see Fig. 4): the lower one is used to compute the trust value over the target pee
by considering only information related to the last transaction occurred with it (the transaction trust), whereas, the top one i
used to reﬁne the trust value computed by the lower layer by using a set of information related to all transactions made with th
target peer (the overall trust).
The lower level uses different information, depending on whether the commentator peer is evaluating a target peer that ha
acted as seller or buyer in the last transaction. According to the proposed e-commerce reputation model, when the target pee
acts as seller, the lower level IT2FLS will have four input variables, named Goods Quality, Deliverity Time, Seller Communicatio
Quality and Shipping Service Reliability and an output one named Transaction Trust. The input variables reﬂect the metrics used b
a buyer reported in the Table 2.
The rule base3 of the lower IT2FLS for a seller peer is composed from 108 rules which were inspired by the paradigm wher
the higher the quality of goods and the shorter the delivery time and the higher the seller communication quality and the highe
the shipping service reliability, the higher is the value of the transaction trust. When the target peer acts as buyer in the las
transaction, the lower layer IT2FLS will have different inputs (reﬂecting the metrics used by a seller reported in the Table 2
which are Payment Time, Buyer Communication Quality and Payment Method Reliability. The rule base4 of the lower IT2FLS for
buyer peer is composed of 36 rules which were inspired by the paradigm where the higher the buyer communication qualit
and the higher the payment method reliability and the shorter the payment time, the higher is the value of the transaction trust
The top level IT2FLS of the hierarchical type-2 FLS has four input variables named Last Transaction Amount, Transaction Trust
Historical Trust and Historical Trust Date, and one output variable representing the overall trust denoted by the variable Overa
Trust. In detail, the variables Last Transaction Amount andHistorical Trust Date reﬂects themetrics reported in the Table 3, whereas
the variable Transaction Trust represents the output of the lower level of the designed hierarchical type-2 fuzzy system. Finally
the variable Historical Trust represents the trust value calculated by the commentator peer over the target one before the las
transaction occurred. The rule base5 of the top level IT2FLC is composed from 225 rules which were inspired by the paradigms
(1) the higher the amount of the last transaction, the higher is the importance of the transaction trust value; (2) the newer th
date of the historical trust and the higher is the importance of the historical trust value.
3 http://old.di.unisa.it/dottorandi/avitiello/research/Type-2FuzzyControllerXBuyerTrust.xlsx .
4 http://old.di.unisa.it/dottorandi/avitiello/research/Type-2FuzzyControllerXSellerTrust.xlsx .
5 http://old.di.unisa.it/dottorandi/avitiello/research/Type-2FuzzyControllerXTopTrust.xlsx .Please cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Pg. 5. (a) Type-2 fuzzy sets for the variables Goods Quality, Seller Communication Quality, Shipping Service Reliability, Buyer Communication Quality, Paymentethod Reliability, Credibility and Opinion Scope; (b) Type-2 fuzzy sets for the variables Deliverity Time and Payment Time; (c) Type-2 fuzzy sets for the variables
ansaction Trust,Historical Trust andOverall Trust; (d) Type-2 fuzzy sets for the variables Last Transaction Amount and Average Amount; (e) Type-2 fuzzy sets for the
riables Historical Trust Date and Opinion Date; (f) Type-2 fuzzy sets for the variableWeight; (g) Fuzzy sets for the linguistic variable Reputation. The dotted lines
present the shape of type-1 fuzzy sets used in experimental results section. See http://old.di.unisa.it/dottorandi/avitiello/research/Type-2FuzzyVariables.xlsx
r the numeric parameters of the type-2 membership functions.
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Fig. 6. The IT2FLS aimed at computing the weight for each commentator peer.
All of type-2 FS memberships of the designed hierarchical IT2 FLS are displayed in Fig. 5. All of type-2 FS memberships295
and the related FOUs have been designed by means of a strong interaction with some experts in the ﬁeld of security in P2P296
systems which allowed us to perfectly tune our reputation system in order to strongly overcome the performance of current297
systems. In particular, all of type-2 FS memberships have been modelled by means of trapezoidal fuzzy sets because this shape298
is more suitable for representing the expert knowledge provided in terms of a collection of intervals. As for inference engine299
details, all the IT2FLSs used in this paper use min operator for implication, min–max operator for composition, the centre of300
sets type-reduction [39] and the defuzziﬁcation is obtained by taking the average of the type-reduced sets produced from301
type-reduction [40].302
4.2.2. Reputation Aggregation Subsystem303
The Reputation Aggregation Subsystem is used by a peer to compute its own reputation value which is a real number within304
the interval [0,1], where 1 represents the highest reputation value. In order to compute such value, a target peer considers the305
overall trust values provided by all the peers which have been involved in a transaction with it. In particular, this subsystem is306
composed of three components where the ﬁrst component is devoted to performing a weighted aggregation of received trust307
values, the second component is aimed at computing a weight for each received trust value and the third component is intro-308
duced to support a semantic interpretation of the computed reputation value. The ﬁrst module calculates the reputation value R309
through the following formula:310
R =
∑N
i=1 trusti ∗ wi∑N
i=1 wi
(1)
where N is the number of commentator peers which have completed a transaction with the target peer, both with the role311
of buyer and seller; trusti is the overall trust value computed over the target peer by the commentator one i; and ﬁnally, wi312
is the weight representing how much the target peer weights the overall trust value trusti provided by the ith commentator313
peer. In order to compute the values wi, a target peer uses the second module of the reputation aggregation subsystem which314
is an IT2FLS (shown in Fig. 6). According to the metrics reported in the Table 4, this IT2FLS has four input variables, which are315
Credibility, Opinion Date, Opinion Scope, Average Amount, and returns the output weight (represented by the variable Weight).316
Fig. 5(a) shows type-2 fuzzy sets for the variables Credibility and Opinion Scope, whereas, Figs. 5(d) and (e) show, respectively,317
type-2 fuzzy sets for the variable Average Amount and the variable Opinion Date. The interval type-2 fuzzy sets representing the318
output variable Weight are displayed in Fig. 5(f). In this IT2FLS, the rule base6 is composed of 81 rules inspired from paradigm319
where the higher the credibility and the newer the date and the higher the number of involved transactions and the higher the320
average amount, the higher is the value of the weight.321
Once a reputation value is computed, characterising what is a good/bad reputation is non trivial [41]. The third component of322
the aggregation reputation subsystem is aimed at accomplishing this task through the exploitation of a linguistic variable, named323
Reputation (see Fig. 5(g)), deﬁned by expert knowledge. In detail, the third component of the aggregation reputation subsystem324
is devoted to fuzzify the real reputation value computed by the ﬁrst component of the same subsystem in order to determine325
the badness of peer behaviours. In particular, the proposed system considers a peer as malicious when it is labelled with the Low326
linguistic term.327
4.2.3. Credibility Computation Subsystem328
The Credibility Computation Subsystem is used by a target peer to update the credibility value of all the other peers which329
have been involved in at least a transaction with it. Many reputation systems (e.g. EigenTrust [8], FuzzyTrust [12]) use the repu-330
tation value as a credibility one. However, this strategy is not suﬃciently accurate, since some peers could behave well sending331
high quality goods, in the case they are sellers, or quick payment, in the case they are buyers, and, at the same time, provide332
inaccurate or false opinions. Therefore, we consider each peer characterised by reputation and credibility values as concepts333
disjointed between them.334
In the proposed system, the target peer performs the updating of credibility of commentator peers after each transaction, by335
considering its new reputation value according to the approach presented in [42]. Initially, each peer which joins the network is336
assigned a neutral credibility value of 0.5 (the range of credibility value is [0, 1]). Then, such value of credibility is increased or337
6 http://old.di.unisa.it/dottorandi/avitiello/research/Type-2FuzzyControllerXCommentatorWeight.xlsx .
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decreased depending on the accuracy of its own opinion (overall trust value) over a target peer. More precisely, the credibility338
value is increased if the degree of closeness between the given opinion and the new computed reputation for the target peer lies339
within a tolerance value , otherwise it is decreased. Formally, this subsystem computes the Credibility Value (CR) as shown in340
Eq. (2):341
CR =
{
CRold + Inc · e−2·error · 11+(10·(CRold−0,5))2 if |error| ≤ 
CRold − Dec ·CR4old if |error| > 
(2)
where CRold is the current credibility value of the peer, error is the difference between the given opinion and the new computed342
reputation,  is the tolerance value, Inc is the maximal possible increment and Dec is the maximal possible decrement. In par-343
ticular, in the proposed system, we set Inc to 0.05 and Dec to 0.2. The choice to set Dec > Inc is derived from human perception,344
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Pccording to which it is harder to gain credibility than to loose it [43]. As for the variable , it is set to 0.3 because such value
uses a peer to move between two different trust levels (represented by fuzzy sets in Fig. 5(c)). Therefore, the system we pro-
ose tolerates an error which does not lead to a change in the overall trust level of a peer. After computing the new credibility
alue for all the commentator peers, the target peer sends these values to the corresponding ones which store them.
.2.4. Trusted E-commerce Database
The information used by the Trust ComputationModule, the Reputation AggregationModule and the Credibility Computation
odule are stored into four tables held by each peer. In detail, they are:
• the buyer transaction tablewhich contains information about transactions where the peer was the buyer. Therefore, this table
contains a record for each transaction where the peer buys a good. In particular, the ﬁelds named Delivery Time, Shipping
Service Reliability, Seller Communication Quality and Goods Quality are used as input to the lower IT2FLS used for seller
evaluation in the Trust Computation Module, whereas, the ﬁeld Amount is used as input for the top IT2FLS of the Trust
Computation Module;
• the seller transaction table which contains information about transaction where the peer was the seller. Therefore, this table
contains a record for each transaction where the peer sells a good. In particular, the ﬁelds named Payment Time, Payment
Method Reliability and Buyer Communication Quality are used as input to the lower IT2FLS used for buyer evaluation in
the the Trust Computation Module, whereas, the ﬁeld Amount is used as input for the top IT2FLS of the Trust Computation
Module;
• the assigned trust table which contains information about trust values computed over the other peers. Therefore, this table
contains a record for each peer with which one has been involved in a transaction. In particular, the ﬁelds named Trust value
and Date are used as input for the top IT2FLS of the Trust Computation Module, respectively, for the variables Historical
Trust and Historical Trust Date. Moreover, the ﬁelds named Trust value and Date are updated after the execution of the Trust
Computation Module. In detail, the value of the Trust ﬁeld is updated with the overall trust value, instead, the value of the
Date ﬁeld is updated with the date of the executed computation;
• the received trust table which contains information about the overall trust received by the commentator peers. Therefore,
this table contains a record for each peer with which one has been involved in a transaction. In particular, the ﬁelds named
Credibility, Opinion Date, Opinion Scope and Average Amount are used as input to the IT2FLS of the Reputation Aggregation
Module in order to compute weights for commentator peers, whereas, the values of the ﬁeld Trust value are the overall trust
values used in the Eq. (1). It is worth noting that all information contained in a record of this table does not change until the
execution of a new transaction with the commentator peer belonging to the record, except for the credibility value, which is
sent by each commentator peer after each transaction involving the target peer.
Table 5 reports the description of each ﬁeld contained in these tables in a detailed way. Moreover, each peer keeps track of its
wn reputation value and its own credibility.
.2.5. The proposed type-2 fuzzy logic based reputation system at work
In this section, we analyse the functioning of the proposed reputation management system after a transaction between a
ller S and a buyer B. For sake of exposition simplicity, let us consider S as the target peer and the set (S) = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn},
ith n = |(S)|, as the group of the peers which have been involved in at least a transaction with S. Therefore, each peer C ∈
(S) and the buyer B act as commentator peers. The task of computation of the reputation value for target peer S, involves the
ctivities shown in Fig. 7. The same mechanism affects the peer B after the performed transaction with the peer S by assuming
e role of “target peer”. By analysing the message overhead, after each transaction, the number of exchanged messages is the
m of the number of exchanged messages by peers S and B which is strongly inﬂuenced by the number of peers belonging to
e set  (different for the peers A and B).
A comparison of the proposed reputation management system with the state-of-the-art approaches in terms of exchanged
essages is reported in the next section, after an evaluation of the proposed reputationmanagement system in terms of detection
te of the malicious peers.
. Experiments and resultsIn this section, we will report various experiments which were conducted to illustrate the beneﬁts of the proposed system in
etecting malicious peers and reducing the usage of bandwidth in P2P networks. We have compared the performance yielded by
lease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Scheme of tables stored by each peer.
Field name Description
Buyer transaction table
Id Transaction Identiﬁer of the transaction
Seller Peer providing the goods
Amount Price of the goods
Delivery Time Time which has been needed to receive the goods
Shipping Service Reliability Reliability of the used shipping service
Seller Communication Quality Availability at communicating of the peer providing the goods
Goods Quality Quality of the purchased goods
Seller transaction table
Id Transaction Identiﬁer of the transaction
Buyer Peer who buys the goods
Amount Price of the goods
Payment Time Time which has been necessary to receive the payment
Payment Method Reliability Reliability of the used payment method
Buyer Communication Quality Availability at communicating of the peer buying the goods
Assigned trust table
Peer Peer receiving the trust value
Trust value The given opinion over the peer
Date Date in which the trust value has been computed and sent to the peer
Received trust table
Peer Commentator peer providing the trust value
Credibility Credibility value of the peer providing the trust value
Trust value The received opinion
Opinion Date Date in which the trust value has been received
Opinion Scope Number of transactions performed with the peer
Average Amount Average price of the goods involved in the transactions performed with the peer
the proposed systemwith state-of-the-art paradigms, including: (1) the reputationmanagement system used by themost known
e-market P2P platform, eBay®, (2) one of the most cited reputation management systems in P2P environments, EigenTrust [8]
(3) one of the most cited reputation management systems in e-commerce P2P environments, PeerTrust [10], and (4) a version o
the proposed reputation system based on conventional type-1 fuzzy sets. In the carried out experiments, the compared system
are executed in a simulated P2P environment based on Intel® CoreTM i5-2410M, 2.3 GHz CPU and 4 GB of RAM.
In the following section, we will present the datasets used to perform the planned experimental sessions. Section 5.2 show
the effectiveness of our proposal by highlighting and reporting its capability of detecting malicious peers in terms of absolut
precision and recall. Section 5.3 reports comparisons between the proposed system and the state-of-the-art reputation manage
ment systems; these comparisons have been conducted in terms of percentage of detected malicious peers, number of fraud
occurred in a simulated scenario based on eBay® auctions, and message overhead.
5.1. The employed datasets
In spite of the large number of research activities accomplished in the reputation management area, no consolidated and
public datasets are available to perform uniﬁed and replicable experiments. As a consequence, a large dataset has been cre
ated by downloading real eBay® transactions from eBay® databases through the eBay® SDK7. This dataset contains the last 10
transactions performed by each of the sellers belonging to a speciﬁc Italian category of goods, i.e., the data storage devices. Thi
dataset is composed of about 5000 transactions, occurring in the period from February to July 2013, whereas, the number o
peers (including sellers and buyers) is 4503. In order to evaluate the proposed system in different situations involving a differen
number of peers, we built three new datasets, referred to as dataset1, dataset2 and dataset3, which respectively include the 10%
50% and 100% of transactions contained in the original dataset. Therefore, these new datasets are, respectively, composed of 490
2307 and 4503 peers. We have augmented dataset1, dataset2 and dataset3with different percentages of malicious peers involved
in different malicious transactions. As described in [44], malicious peers are those that both misbehave and lie in providing thei
feedbacks values. In particular, in our context, malicious peers misbehave by making, as buyers, late or no payments, and, a
sellers, delivering bad-quality goods or not delivering them at all [12]. In literature, the most studied malicious behaviours ar
known as Naive, Discriminatory, Hypocritical and Oscillatory [45] which can be explained as follows:
• Naive: the malicious peer always misbehaves and gives unfairly low recommendations about the others [46];
• Discriminatory: themalicious peer selects a group of victims and alwaysmisbehaveswith them [8,46]. Besides, it gives unfairl
low recommendations about victims. For other peers, it behaves as a good one;
7 https://go.developer.ebay.com/ .Please cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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PFig. 7. The activity diagram related to the reputation computation by the seller S after a transaction with the buyer B.
• Hypocritical: the malicious peer misbehaves and gives unfairly low recommendation with x percent probability [8,47]. In
other times, it behaves as a good peer;
• Oscillatory: the malicious peer builds its own high reputation by being good for a long time period, during which, it per-
forms transactions characterised by small amounts of money. Then, it behaves as a naive peer for a short period of time by
performing transactions characterised by large amounts of money. After the malicious period, it becomes a good peer again.
Each artiﬁcial malicious transaction involves a good peer, already present in the original dataset, with a synthetic malicious
eer. The new datasets are named MaliciousDataset_X_Y, where X = 1,2,3 represents the starting dataset, i.e, dataset1, dataset2
r dataset3, and Y = 5,10,20 is the percentage of added malicious peers, i.e, 5%, 10% and 20%. The number of synthetic Naive,
iscriminatory, Hypocritical and Oscillatory peers within each dataset is the same. In particular, by considering malicious peer
eﬁnition, Hypocritical peers have been created by considering x equal to 25%, 50%, or 75%, Discriminatory buyers have beeneated by considering as victims the 10% of all sellers, whereas, Discriminatory sellers select only 1% of all buyers as victims.
able 6 shows the details of the number of peers involved in all planned experimental sessions.
Hereafter, the details about the performed experiments are given.
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Table 6
Number of peers characterising the datasets used
by all planned experimental sessions.
Dataset name Number of peers
MaliciousDataset_1_5 514
MaliciousDataset_1_10 538
MaliciousDataset_1_20 587
MaliciousDataset_2_5 2411
MaliciousDataset_2_10 2537
MaliciousDataset_2_20 2768
MaliciousDataset_3_5 4727
MaliciousDataset_3_10 4952
MaliciousDataset_3_20 5403
Table 7
Precisionmalicious and Recallmalicious of the proposed reputation system.
Dataset name Precisionmalicious Recallmalicious
MaliciousDataset_1_5 0.82 0.92
MaliciousDataset_1_10 0.81 0.88
MaliciousDataset_1_20 0.82 0.88
MaliciousDataset_2_5 0.99 0.83
MaliciousDataset_2_10 0.88 0.86
MaliciousDataset_2_20 0.89 0.85
MaliciousDataset_3_5 0.89 0.84
MaliciousDataset_3_10 0.89 0.84
MaliciousDataset_3_20 0.87 0.87
Average 0.87 0.86
5.2. Evaluation of the proposed reputation management system432
In this section, we analyse the capability of the proposed reputation management system in detecting malicious peers. As433
described in Section 4.2.2, our system considers a peer as malicious when it is characterised by a reputation value labelled with434
the Low linguistic term. The performance of our system is measured through the use of two well-established metrics, namely435
Precision and Recall. Precisely, in reputation scenario, precision and recall are deﬁned as follows:436
Precisionmalicious =
t p
t p+ f p (3)
437
Recallmalicious =
t p
t p+ f n (4)
where tp is the number of true positives, i.e., the number of malicious peers which are correctly identiﬁed as malicious, fp is the438
number of false positives, i.e., the number of good peers that are identiﬁed as malicious, and fn is the number of the false negatives,439
i.e., the number of malicious peers that are wrongly identiﬁed as good peers. The values tp, fp and fn have been computed by440
applying the proposed reputation management system to a dataset of trading transactions performed in a past interval time441
in order to label each peer, involved in those transactions, as malicious or not malicious; successively, for each peer, the label442
computed by the reputation management system (malicious, not malicious) is compared with the real nature of the same peer443
(malicious, not malicious) in the original dataset. The result of these comparisons determines the value of tp, fp and fn.444
Table 7 shows the Precisionmalicious and Recallmalicious values obtained by the proposed reputation management system by445
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457considering all created malicious datasets. Table 8 shows the detection rate (which is computed using the Recallmalicious ) in
percentage for each kind of malicious peer by considering the same nine datasets.
As shown in the Table 7, the proposed system yields good performance, being characterised by an average Precisionmaliciou
equals to 0.87 and an average Recallmalicious equals to 0.86.
5.3. Comparative study with the state-of-the-art paradigms
In this section, we compare of the proposed system with EigenTrust, PeerTrust and the eBay® feedback reputation manage
ment system as well as type-1 its fuzzy counterpart. In particular, among PeerTrust variants, we consider PeerTrust PSM sinc
it represents the most performing variant as described in [10]. The comparison is carried out by considering three experimenta
sessions. Firstly, we perform a statistical comparative study based on the malicious peer detection rate measured in terms o
Precisionmalicious and Recallmalicious (see Eqs. 3 and 4, respectively). Secondly, we perform a comparative study evaluating the num
ber of frauds occurred in a simulated operative scenario based on eBay® auctions. Finally, we perform an eﬃciency comparison
in terms of message overhead. Hereafter, the details about the three experimental sessions are given.Please cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Table 8
Percentage of detection for each kind of malicious peer.
Dataset name Kind of malicious peer Percentage (%)
MaliciousDataset_1_5 Naive 100
Discriminatory 100
Hypocritical 66.70
Oscillatory 100
MaliciousDataset_1_10 Naive 92.30
Discriminatory 92.30
Hypocritical 63.60
Oscillatory 100.00
MaliciousDataset_1_20 Naive 100
Discriminatory 95.80
Hypocritical 70.80
Oscillatory 83.30
MaliciousDataset_2_5 Naive 100
Discriminatory 82.10
Hypocritical 64.30
Oscillatory 82.10
MaliciousDataset_2_10 Naive 100
Discriminatory 98.30
Hypocritical 66.70
Oscillatory 77.20
MaliciousDataset_2_20 Naive 99.10
Discriminatory 99.10
Hypocritical 63.50
Oscillatory 77.40
MaliciousDataset_3_5 Naive 100
Discriminatory 98.20
Hypocritical 65.50
Oscillatory 70.90
MaliciousDataset_3_10 Naive 100
Ta
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PDiscriminatory 100
Hypocritical 65.20
Oscillatory 70.50
MaliciousDataset_3_20 Naive 100
Discriminatory 99.60
Hypocritical 64.90
Oscillatory 84.80
ble 9
rategies to detect malicious peers adopted by the compared reputation management systems.
Reputation management
system
Strategy
eBay® A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a negative feedback score.
EigenTrust Due to its probabilistic interpretation of reputation, a peer is malicious when it is characterised by a global trust value less
than 1/N, where N is the number of peers in the network.
PeerTrust A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a global trust value less than or equal to 1 − mrate, wheremrate represents
the average number of malicious transactions made by each malicious peer.
Type-1 FLS A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a reputation value labelled with the Low linguistic term.
Our system A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a reputation value labelled with the Low linguistic term.
.3.1. Comparison in terms of malicious peer detection rate
In this section, we show the results of the comparison between the proposed system and the other paradigms in terms of
recision and recall in the detection of malicious peer.
Precision and recall generally vary inversely; that is, as precision increases, recall generally decreases, and vice versa. For this
ason, it can be very diﬃcult to achieve high recall and high precision simultaneously [48]. As shown in this section through an
mpirical comparison followed by a statistical test, the proposed system improves state-of-the-art because it is able to yield high
call without losing in precision.
In order to perform our comparison, it is necessary to highlight how each compared algorithms detect a malicious peer.
able 9 summarises the strategy used by each compared reputation management system to detect malicious peer. It is possible
note that, different from our system and the type-1 FLS, eBay® feedback system, PeerTrust and EigenTrust do not provide a
rmal method for identifying malicious peers, but they just compute a peer ranking based on their reputation value.
In Tables 10 and 11, we show themalicious peer detection rate obtained for the compared systems on the nine aforementioned
atasets in terms of Precision and Recall , respectively.malicious malicious
lease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Table 10
Malicious peer detection rate in terms of Precisionmalicious for the compared reputationmanagement
systems.
Dataset name Our system Type-1 FLSs eBay® EigenTrust PeerTrust
MaliciousDataset_1_5 0.82 0.77 0.90 0.04 0.94
MaliciousDataset_1_10 0.81 0.82 0.85 0.09 0.90
MaliciousDataset_1_20 0.82 0.79 0.87 0.15 1.00
MaliciousDataset_2_5 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.04 0.98
MaliciousDataset_2_10 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.08 0.94
MaliciousDataset_2_20 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.15 0.95
MaliciousDataset_3_5 0.89 0.93 0.86 0.04 0.92
MaliciousDataset_3_10 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.08 0.95
MaliciousDataset_3_20 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.14 0.93
Average 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.09 0.95
Table 11
Malicious peer detection rate in terms of Recallmalicious for the compared reputation management
systems.
Dataset name Our system Type-1 FLSs eBay® EigenTrust PeerTrust
MaliciousDataset_1_5 0.92 0.71 0.7 0.83 0.63
MaliciousDataset_1_10 0.88 0.67 0.71 0.90 0.54
MaliciousDataset_1_20 0.88 0.64 0.69 0.85 0.52
MaliciousDataset_2_5 0.83 0.55 0.73 0.88 0.54
MaliciousDataset_2_10 0.86 0.58 0.70 0.82 0.57
MaliciousDataset_2_20 0.85 0.59 0.71 0.85 0.56
MaliciousDataset_3_5 0.84 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.54
MaliciousDataset_3_10 0.84 0.58 0.71 0.80 0.57
MaliciousDataset_3_20 0.87 0.59 0.70 0.81 0.57
Average 0.86 0.61 0.71 0.84 0.56
By analysing Tables 10 and 11, it is possible to note that PeerTrust is the best performer in terms of precision but it is char-471
acterised by the lowest recall. Vice versa, EigenTrust is characterised by a high recall, but it is the worst performer in terms472
of precision. As for eBay® and the type-1 FLS, they have a high precision but a low recall. Therefore, all the state-of-the-art473
approaches are not able to yield high precision and high recall simultaneously. As for the proposed system, it is characterised474
by a high precision (similar to eBay®, the type-1 FLS and the best performer PeerTrust), and, at the same time, it yields high475
recall (resulting as the best performer in terms of recall). Therefore, from this empirical comparison, it is possible to state476
that the proposed system improves state-of-the-art because it is the only system that achieves high precision and high recall,477
simultaneously.478
In order to validate this empirical result, we perform a multiple comparison statistical procedure for each of considered479
performance metric, i.e., precision and recall. In general, a multiple statistical comparison procedure is composed of two steps480
[49]: in the ﬁrst one, a statistical technique is used to determine whether the results provided by the considered algorithms481
present any inequality; in the second one, which is performed only if in the ﬁrst step an inequality is found, a post-hoc test is482
led in order to determined which algorithm better outperforms. In particular, we use Friedman’s test in the ﬁrst step and Holm’s483
method as post-hoc procedure since they are among the most used statistical procedures [50].484
Friedman’s test is a non-parametric statistical procedure which aims at detecting if a signiﬁcant difference among the be-485
haviour of two or more algorithms exists. Friedman’s test ranks the algorithms under comparison for each data set separately,486
the best performing algorithm getting the rank of 1, the second best rank 2, and so on [51]. Similar to other multiple comparison487
procedure, under the null-hypothesis, Friedman’s test states that all algorithms are equivalent, hence, a rejection of this hypoth-488
l489
490
491
492
493
s494
.495
r496
a497
498
e499
l500
501esis implies the existence of differences among the performance of at least two studied algorithms [49]. In order to reject the nul
hypothesis, Friedman’s test statistic χ2α computed by using aforementioned ranks must be equal to or greater than the tabled
critical chi-square value at the speciﬁed level of signiﬁcance [52].
In our experimentation, the most used level of signiﬁcance α equal to 0.05 is set. The data sample for each compared system
is composed of nine items for each performance measure, one for each considered dataset. In other words, data reported in
Tables 10 and 11 are used as data samples. Table 12 shows the ranking obtained by all compared approaches during Friedman’
tests performed for Precisionmalicious and Recallmalicious. The computed Friedman’s statistics are, respectively, 24.38 and 33.84
Since they are greater than the critical value for four degrees of freedom χ20.05 = 9.4877 (to be considered being ﬁve the numbe
of compared algorithms), the null hypothesis is rejected for each performance metric and it is possible to assess that there is
signiﬁcant difference between at least two of the compared algorithms as for all considered performance metrics.
According to this result, a post-hoc statistical analysis is needed to conduct pairwise comparisons in order to detect concret
differences among compared algorithms. Holm’s procedure is a multiple comparison procedure that works by setting a contro
algorithm and comparing it with the remaining ones. Normally, the algorithm which obtains the lowest value of ranking inPlease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Table 12
Friedman’s test ranking for all considered metrics.
Algorithm name Precisionmalicious Recallmalicious
Our system 3.11 1.28
Type-1 FLS 2.61 3.89
eBay® 2.89 3.11
EigenTrust 5.00 1.72
PeerTrust 1.39 5.00
Table 13
Holm’s test results for Precisionmalicious . The control algorithm is PeerTrust.
i Algorithm z value Unadjusted p-value α
(k−i) , α = 0.05
4 Type-1 FLS 1.6398 0.1011 0.0500
3 eBay® 2.0125 0.0442 0.0250
2 Our system 2.3106 0.0209 0.0167
1 EigenTrust 4.8448 0.0013e-03 0.0125
Table 14
Holm’s test results for Recallmalicious . The control algorithm is our system.
i Algorithm z value Unadjusted p-value α
(k−i) , α = 0.05
4 EigenTrust 0.5963 0.5510 0.0500
3 eBay® 2.4597 0.0139 0.0250
2 Type-1 FLS 3.5032 0.0460e-02 0.0167
1 PeerTrust 4.9939 0.0059e-07 0.0125
Friedman’s test is chosen as control algorithm. In our experimentation, as shown in Table 12, PeerTrust is chosen as control502
algorithm for Precisionmalicious, whereas, our system is chosen for Recallmalicious. Also for this test, we use the typical signiﬁcance503
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Pvel equal to 0.05. Data computed by Holm’s procedure for each performance metric are depicted in Tables 13 and 14. Holm’s
st works on a family of hypotheses where each one is related to a comparison between the control method and one of the
maining algorithms. In detail, Holm’s method sequentially checks the null hypotheses ordered by the p-values. If the p-value
below the corresponding α/(k − i), the null hypothesis is rejected and we are allowed to compare the second p-value with the
rresponding α/(k − i). If the second null hypothesis is rejected, the test proceeds with the third, and so on. As soon as a certain
ull hypothesis cannot be rejected, all the remaining hypotheses are retained as well [51].
By analysing the Table 13 for the Precisionmalicious, Holm’s procedure rejects only the ﬁrst hypothesis, and as a consequence, it
possible to state that PeerTrust is better than EigenTrust, whereas, there is not statistical difference with the other approaches,
e., type-1 FLS, eBay® and our system at 95% conﬁdence level (α is set to 0.05). As for the Recallmalicious, by analysing the Table 14,
ur system is better than PeerTrust, type-1 FLS and eBay®, whereas, there is not a statistical difference with EigenTrust at 95%
nﬁdence level (α is set to 0.05).
By summarising the statistical test results, our system, PeerTrust, type-1 FLS and eBay® have the same high performance in
rms of precision, whereas, our system and EigenTrust have the same high performance in terms of recall. Therefore, also by
rrying out a statistical comparison, our system is the only one that achieves high level of precision and high level of recall,
multaneously.
.3.2. Comparison in a simulated eBay® scenario
This section is devoted to compare the proposed systemwith the state-of-the-art paradigms in a simulated operative scenario.
he comparison is carried out by taking into account the number of frauds which occurs in typical eBay® auctions even though
e aforementioned reputation management systems are used.
An auction is a public sale of goods in which prospective buyers take bids and the item is sold to the highest bidder. Unfortu-
ately, this kind of selling is not a scenario devoid of possible frauds. In particular, buyers who win the auction by bidding very
igh amounts could have no intention of paying for the item on sale.
Our experiment consists of performing a set of simulated independent auctions and taking note of how many times a ma-
cious peer succeeds in winning an auction in spite of the seller capability to block a buyer bid, for each of the ﬁve evaluated
putation systems in turns. The lesser the number of the malicious peers winning an auction, the higher is the eﬃciency of the
sed reputation system. The simulated eBay® scenario is conﬁgured by reading a collection of past trading transactions stored in
ne of the eBay® dataset created in the previous section, and computing a reputation value for each peer involved in those sales
y means of the ﬁve considered reputation systems in turns. Successively, a simulated auction is created by generating a random
t of prospective buyers with a related bid amount for that auction. At this point, each reputation management system identi-
es the potential malicious peers in the set of generated buyers, by using its own speciﬁc technique as shown in Table 9. Then,lease cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Table 15
Comparison between our proposal, its corresponding version based on type-1 fuzzy sets, eBay® feedback system,
PeerTrust and EigenTrust about the number of frauds, in percentage, occurred on 1000 auctions.
Dataset name Our system (%) Type-1 FLSs (%) eBay® (%) EigenTrust (%) PeerTrust (%)
MaliciousDataset_1_5 1.0 3.9 4.4 10.7 4.8
MaliciousDataset_1_10 3.3 8.8 6.0 19.5 11.5
MaliciousDataset_1_20 5.5 15.5 14.7 34.3 21.4
MaliciousDataset_2_5 2.6 5.1 3.1 10.3 5.3
MaliciousDataset_2_10 2.8 8.6 6.8 18.0 9.6
MaliciousDataset_2_20 6.9 16.1 11.5 31.6 16.5
MaliciousDataset_3_5 1.6 4.5 3.0 8.9 4.4
MaliciousDataset_3_10 4.0 9.9 7.2 21.1 9.8
MaliciousDataset_3_20 6.3 19.1 14.4 34.4 18.5
Average 3.78 10.16 7.9 20.98 11.31
Table 16
Comparison between the proposed system and EigenTrust about the message over-
head.
Dataset name EigenTrust Our system Improvement (%)
MaliciousDataset_1_5 1,842,401 28,923 98.43
MaliciousDataset_1_10 2,625,997 37,617 98.57
MaliciousDataset_1_20 4,650,041 58,423 98.74
MaliciousDataset_2_5 46,656,137 467,838 99.00
MaliciousDataset_2_10 77,577,970 521,871 99.33
MaliciousDataset_2_20 139„984,305 884,972 99.37
MaliciousDataset_3_5 211,730,601 1,073,226 99.49
MaliciousDataset_3_10 313,641,879 1,555,764 99.50
MaliciousDataset_3_20 595,907,393 2,823,736 99.53
Average 154,957,413.8 828,041.1 99.11
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564potential fraudulent buyers are removed from the auction according to the strategy provided by the ﬁve evaluated reputation
systems in turns, and the highest buyer bidder is selected as auction winner.
Table 15 illustrates the results of this experiment which consists of performing 1000 independent auctions. The number o
malicious peers winning an auction is expressed as a percentage. As can be seen from Table 15, the proposed system outperform
the type-1 fuzzy based system, the eBay® reputation system, PeerTrust and EigenTrust in all studied cases, with an averag
relative improvement in percentage equals to 62.80%, 52.15%, 66.60% and 81.98%, respectively.
5.3.3. Comparison in terms of message overhead
In this section, we compare the proposed reputation management system and EigenTrust in terms of message overhead b
considering the employed datasets. The message overhead is a useful metric to understand the suitability of the reputation
management systems in P2P environments where reducing network overload is a crucial factor to avoid network congestion
The comparison excludes eBay® because its reputation functionalities are based on a centralised website approach. Therefore
eBay® does not exchange messages to evaluate the peers’ reputation and, as a consequence, it is not comparable (in terms o
message overhead) with a full P2P approach as the proposed system and EigenTrust. At the same way, PeerTrust is excluded b
this comparison since it does not make known the used message exchange scheme. Finally, the reputation management system
based on type-1 fuzzy systems is excluded from this comparison because it is based on the same message exchange mechanism
provided by the proposed reputation management system. The results of this experiment are shown in Table 16. Fig. 8 show
a plot of the number of messages that the two compared systems exchange after each transaction belonging to the datase
MaliciousDataset_1_5. By analysing the average message overhead per peer, it was found that our proposed system transmits 5
messages with a standard deviation of 256, compared to 3584 messages, with a standard deviation of 2144, transmitted per pee
by using EigenTrust.
As shown in the Table 16, our system exchanges a number of messages always lesser than that required by EigenTrust. In
particular, the average relative improvement in percentage is equal to 99.11%. This result makes our proposal particularly suitabl
to be embedded in next generation of P2P e-commerce networks that, different from the eBay® portal, will be implemented b
means of a pure distributed approach where the overhead related to the message exchange will play a key role for improving th
performance of the overall system.
The high message overhead characterising EigenTrust is due to the notion of transitive trust which causes the updating o
reputation values for all peers after each transaction. Moreover, the number of exchanged messages characterising the proposed
reputation system is held furthermore low thanks to the storing of information in memory tables (as described in Section 4)
However, it is important to note that this feature does not represent a weakness for our system considering the storage capabili
ties of the current peer hardware. Indeed, by considering the largest dataset (referred to as MaliciousDataset_3_20), the amoun
of the memory space occupied by tables for the peer with the most number of transactions (precisely, 231) is around 37 Kbyte.Please cite this article as: G. Acampora et al., An interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in
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Fig. 8. Messages sent after each transaction belonging to the dataset MaliciousDataset_1_5.
6. Conclusions and future work565
The Internet is changing the life style of people from all over the World thanks to its capabilities to provide smart services,566
everywhere and at any time. E-commerce is regarded as a very important Internet service which is providing manufactures and567
vendors with more business opportunities and, consequently, allowing customers to beneﬁt of a global, quicker and cheaper568
shopping environment. Latest trends in e-commerce, e.g. eBay®, are focusing on a P2P philosophy where people use enhanced569
mobile technologies to start direct trading interactions among themselves. In P2P scenarios, it is crucial to protect both buyers570
and sellers (the peers) from being victimised by possible fraud arising from the uncertainties, vagueness and ambiguities that571
characterise the interactions amongst unknown business entities. As a consequence, e-commerce websites are integrating so-572
called reputation management systems in their trading frameworks to assess the trustworthiness of each person involved in573
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Pe trade. In spite of the large number of researches performed in this ﬁeld during last two decades, current approaches for
entifying frauds and malicious persons are not yet enough eﬃcient in preventing most of the committed fraud.
In this paper, we presented a type-2 fuzzy logic based reputation management system which can handle the various faced
ncertainties, vagueness and ambiguities to produce better reputationmanagement (when compared to the fuzzy and non fuzzy
ased reputation management systems) in terms of malicious peer detection and exchanged message overhead. The beneﬁts
rovided by the developed framework have been tested on a real data sets of eBay® transactions in order to show the superiority
f the proposed paradigm when compared to the state-of-the-art paradigms. In particular, the proposed system is the only
stem that achieves, simultaneously, high level of precision and recall in detecting malicious peers as shown by a multiple
mparison statistical test. Besides, the proposed system outperforms the type-1 fuzzy based system, the eBay® reputation
stem, PeerTrust and EigenTrust in a simulated eBay® scenario, with an average relative improvement in percentage that is equal
62.80%, 52.15%, 66.60% and 81.98%, respectively. Moreover, the proposed system exchanges a number ofmessages always lesser
an EigenTrust, precisely, the average relative improvement in percentage on all employed datasets is equal to 99.11%, making
ur reputation management system particularly suitable to be embedded in a pure P2P network.
For our future work, we intend to integrate adaptive systems with the proposed approach in order to autonomously and
roactively adapt the behaviour of the reputation systemwhen the behaviour of malicious peers changes or new and unexpected
alicious behaviours occur.
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